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on the interest rate faced by finitely-lived agents. Our core model features age-independent 
wages and a constant mortality rate. In the first extension we study the implications for 
microeconomic decisions and macroeconomic outcomes of a hump-shaped life-cycle profile 
in labour productivity, whilst in the second extension we postulate a realistic mortality 
process. Our main findings are that the limited availability of annuities induces agents to 
retire early in the first two models, but later in the model with age-dependent mortality. In all 
cases, the general equilibrium repercussion is that economic growth is lower under imperfect 
annuities than with perfect annuities. 
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July 13, 2009 1 Introduction
Economic wisdom suggests that annuities are welfare maximizing in the presence of life-time
uncertainty (Yaari, 1965). Surprisingly, however, the availability of annuities around the
world is severely limited (Cannon and Tonks, 2008). Taking this observation into account,
numerous studies have investigated the implications of the limited availability of annuities on
life-cycle choices made by individuals (see, for instance, Abel, 1985, Hurd, 1989, and Leung,
1994, 2007).
The limited availability of annuities does not only aﬀect decisions of individuals. Indeed,
this ﬁnancial imperfection also has aggregate eﬀects on the economy through the market for
loanable funds and the labour market. Somewhat surprisingly, however, this macroeconomic
eﬀect of imperfect annuity markets has only received scant attention in the literature. In the
current paper we elaborate on exactly this point. That is, we study the implications of an
imperfect annuity market on both the consumption, labour supply, retirement, and saving
decisions by individual agents and the general equilibrium repercussions thereof.
We study the relationship between the annuity market imperfection and economic growth
by developing an overlapping generations model featuring endogenous growth. Individuals
choose labour supply endogenously. We model the annuity market imperfection by introduc-
ing a load factor which renders the interest rate on annuities less than actuarially fair. As
a result, this load factor leads to proﬁts for the annuity ﬁrms, which are redistributed to
the agents in a lump-sum fashion. In the core model agents face a constant mortality rate
(as in Blanchard, 1985) and constant productivity over their life-cycle. Although convenient
to analyze, the core model suﬀers from a number of empirical deﬁciencies that might bias
our results. To address these deﬁciencies we study two extensions, namely age-dependent
productivity and mortality. We do so in isolation at ﬁrst, and then in concert.
Our main ﬁnding is that an imperfect annuity market leads to a reduction of the economic
growth rate, although the quantitative eﬀect is rather small in a plausibly calibrated version
of the model. This conclusion derives from the fact that overpriced annuities retard the
accumulation of capital, which constitutes the engine of growth in our model. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that incorporating realistic aspects of the life-cycle has important eﬀects on the
quantitative results. That is, whereas the core model suggests that a modest increase in the
load factor causes a reduction in the growth rate of 28 basis points (from 1% per annum
2to 0.72%), a plausibly calibrated model–featuring both extensions mentioned above–only
suggests a reduction of about 9 basis points. This discrepancy is a direct consequence of
the fact that the constant mortality rate featuring in the core model kills oﬀ the young too
quickly and the old too slowly.
In addition we ﬁnd that labour supply and–especially–retirement, are hardly aﬀected by
an imperfect annuity market. In the calibrated model, the increase in the load factor causes
agents to retire 2 months later and to supply only marginally less labour during their active
career. Again we ﬁnd that a correctly modeled mortality structure is crucial. That is, in the
core model agents retire 18 months early and reduce labour supply by 10% during their active
career.
From a theoretical point of view two ﬁndings stand out. First, we ﬁnd that, in the presence
of annuity market imperfections and with age-dependent mortality, consumption exhibits a
hump-shaped proﬁle whereas for perfect annuities it is ever increasing. This is in line with the
results of B¨ utler (2001) and Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008) who show that such imperfections
lead the agents to discount future consumption by their mortality rate. Second, we ﬁnd that
asset accumulation decreases in the presence of an imperfect annuity market. A similar result
is provided by Abel (1985) and Fuster (1999) who show that asset accumulation decreases
if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is not less than unity and there is steady state
growth.
Previous work on the limited availability of annuities has mainly focused on individual
choices, disregarding labour supply decisions and assuming the complete absence of annuity
markets; see, for instance, Abel (1985), Hurd (1989), and Leung (1994, 2007). Similarly,
the small number of computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses have typically focused
on the complete absence of annuities and exogenous labour supply; see, for instance, Fuster
(1999), Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa et al. (2009). In contrast, Pecchenino and
Pollard (1997) use a Diamond-Samuelson model to study the general equilibrium impact
of a truly imperfect annuity market. Although only focusing on individual choices, B¨ utler
(2001) introduces endogenous labour supply and also focuses on an imperfect annuity market.
Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008) drop the endogenous labour supply part of the B¨ utler (2001)
model and study the implications of an imperfect annuity market in general equilibrium. Our
paper adds to this literature by speciﬁcally focusing on imperfect annuities in relationship to
3endogenous labour supply and, especially, a realistic demographic structure.1
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the core model,
whilst section 3 studies the relationship between annuity market imperfection, retirement
and economic growth. Section 4 introduces the two extensions that allow our model to better
resemble realistic features of life-cycle choices. Section 5 concludes. There is a separate
appendix (Heijdra and Mierau, 2009a) containing all derivations.
2 Model
2.1 Firms
The production side of the model makes use of the insights of Romer (1989) and postulates
the existence of suﬃciently strong external eﬀects operating between private ﬁrms in the
economy. There is a large and ﬁxed number, N0, of identical, perfectly competitive ﬁrms.
The technology available to ﬁrm i is given by:
Yi (t) = Z (t)Ki (t)
εK Li (t)
1−εK , 0 < εK < 1, (1)
where Yi (t) is output, Ki (t) is capital use, Li (t) is the labour input, and Z (t) represents
the general level of factor productivity which is taken as given by individual ﬁrms. The
competitive ﬁrm hires factors of production according to the following marginal productivity
conditions:
w(t) = (1 − εK)Z (t)κi (t)
εK , (2)
r(t) + δ = εKZ (t)κi (t)
εK−1 , (3)
where κi (t) ≡ Ki (t)/Li (t) is the capital intensity. The rental rate on each factor is the
same for all ﬁrms, i.e. they all choose the same capital intensity and κi (t) = κ(t) for all
i = 1,··· ,N0. This is a very useful property of the model because it enables us to aggregate
the microeconomic relations to the macroeconomic level.
Generalizing the insights of Saint-Paul (1992, p. 1247) and Paul Romer (1989) to a
growing population, we assume that the inter-ﬁrm externality takes the following form:
Z (t) = Z0κ(t)
1−εK , (4)
1Recent papers including a realistic demographic structure and perfect annuities in a general equilibrium
setting include Boucekkine et al. (2002), d’Albis (2007), and Heijdra and Romp (2008, 2009a, 2009b).
4where Z0 is a positive constant, κ(t) ≡ K (t)/L(t) is the economy-wide capital intensity,
K (t) ≡
 
i Ki (t) is the aggregate capital stock, and L(t) ≡
 
i Li (t) is aggregate employ-
ment. According to (4), total factor productivity depends positively on the aggregate capital
intensity, i.e. if an individual ﬁrm i raises its capital intensity, then all ﬁrms in the economy
beneﬁt somewhat as a result because the general productivity indicator rises for all of them.
Using (4), equations (1)–(3) can now be rewritten in aggregate terms:2
Y (t) = Z0K (t), (5)
w(t)L(t) = (1 − εK)Y (t), (6)
r(t) = r = εKZ0 − δ, (7)
where Y (t) ≡
 
i Yi (t) is aggregate output and we assume that capital is suﬃciently pro-




We generalize the Blanchard (1985) model of consumer behaviour by including an endogenous
labour-leisure decision and by assuming potentially imperfect annuity markets. At time t,










where C (v,τ) is consumption, L(v,τ) is labour supply (the time endowment is equal to
unity), ρ is the pure rate of time preference, and µ is the instantaneous mortality rate.
The agent’s budget identity is given by:
˙ A(v,τ) = rAA(v,τ) + w(τ)L(v,τ) − C(v,τ) + Π(v,τ), (9)
where A(v,τ) is the stock of ﬁnancial assets, rA is the annuity rate of interest rate, w(τ) is
the wage rate, and Π(v,τ) is a lump-sum transfers from life insurance companies (see below).
2All ﬁrms use the same capital intensity (κi (t) = κ(t)), so that Yi (t) = Li (t)Z (t)κ(t)
εK and
Y (t) = L(t)Z (t)κ(t)
εK. By using (4) in this expression, we ﬁnd (5). For the wage we ﬁnd w(t) =
(1 − εK)Z (t)κ(t)
εK = (1 − εK)Z0κ(t), which can be rewritten to get (6). Finally, for the rental rate on
capital we ﬁnd r(t) + δ = εKZ (t)κ(t)
εK−1 = εKZ0.
5Following Yaari (1965), we postulate the existence of annuity markets, but unlike Yaari we
allow the annuities to be less than actuarially fair. Since the agent is subject to lifetime
uncertainty and has no bequest motive, he/she will fully annuitize so that the annuity rate
of interest facing the agent is given by:
rA ≡ r + θµ, (10)
where r is the real interest rate (see (7)), and θ is a load factor that measures the degree of
imperfection of the annuities (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Although there are numerous explanations for the
overpricing of annuities (Cannon and Tonks, 2008, ch. 8) the main reason for imperfections
on the annuity markets seems to be adverse selection (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004,
and 2006). That is, agents with a low mortality rate are more likely to buy annuities than
agents with high mortality rates. However, because mortality is private information annuity
ﬁrms “mis-price” annuities for low-mortality agents, thus creating a load factor.3
Our speciﬁcation is quite general and incorporates three important cases:
• Perfect annuities (PA). The case of perfect (actuarially fair) annuities is obtained by
setting θ = 1. Life insurance companies break even, and Π(v,τ) = 0.
• Imperfect annuities (IA). The case of imperfect (less than actuarially fair) annuities
is obtained by assuming 0 < θ < 1. Life insurance companies make excess proﬁts,
Π(τ) = µ(1 − θ)A(τ), which are taxed away by the government and distributed in a
lump-sum fashion to surviving agents.
• No annuities (NA). For θ = 0 there are no annuity markets. The agent can save at the
interest rate r, but borrowing is impossible because, with lifetime uncertainty, he/she
faces a probabilistic time-of-death wealth constraint of the form, prob{A(v,τ) ≥ 0} = 1
(Yaari, 1965, p. 139). By deﬁnition, Π(v,τ) = 0.
In the remainder of this paper we restrict attention to the PA and IA cases.4
The agent chooses time proﬁles for C (v,τ), A(v,τ), and L(v,τ) (for τ ≥ t) in order to
maximize (1), subject to (i) the budget identity (2), (ii) a NPG condition, limτ→∞ A(v,τ)
3Alternatively adverse selection eﬀects could lead to quantity rationing in the sense that agents cannot buy
the amount of annuities they want (see, Eckstein et al., 1985 and Eichenbaum and Peled, 1987). In the current
paper we ignore such rationing and focus purely on the price eﬀect of adverse selection.
4We study the NA case in a companion paper; see Heijdra and Mierau (2009b).
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Figure 1: Life-cycle consumption, labour supply, and retirement
e(r+θµ)(t−τ) = 0, (iii) the initial asset position in the planning period, A(v,t), and (iv) a
non-negativity condition, L(v,τ) ≥ 0. The solution of this optimization problem is presented
in detail in Heijdra and Mierau (2009a, Appendix A). For expositional purposes, however,
here we restrict attention to the optimal individual life-cycle decisions in the context of an
economy moving along a steady-state balanced growth path.5
Along the balanced growth path, labour productivity grows at a constant exponential
rate, ˆ γ (see below), and as a result individual agents face an upward sloping path for real
wages over their lifetimes:
w(τ) = w(v)eˆ γ(τ−v). (11)
The consumption Euler equation is given by:
˙ C (v,τ)
C (v,τ)
= r − ρ − (1 − θ)µ > 0. (12)
5The transitional dynamic properties of the models discussed in this paper can be studied numerically by
discretizing it.
7With imperfect annuities, individual consumption growth is aﬀected by the mortality rate, a
result ﬁrst demonstrated for the case with θ = 0 by Yaari (1965, p. 143). During the working
period, the agent equates the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
to the wage rate at all times, i.e.:
(1 − εC)/(1 − L(v,τ))
εC/C (v,τ)
= w(τ). (13)
The consumption-leisure choice is illustrated in Figure 1, where C (u)/w(0) and L(u) stand
for, respectively, consumption (scaled by the wage rate at birth) and labour supply of the agent
at age u. The initial choice at age u = 0 is at point E0 where there is a tangency between an
indiﬀerence curve (labeled U0) and a “budget line” (labeled BE0).6 If there were no economic
growth, the wage rate would be constant over the agent’s lifetime and the optimum would
gradually move along the dashed line from E0 to A at which point it is optimal to retire.
This move reﬂects the positive wealth eﬀect on the demands for consumption and leisure.
After retirement, the agent would move along the vertical leisure constraint in the direction
of points E1 and E2.
Matters are slightly more complicated in the presence of economic growth and an upward
sloping wage proﬁle (11). Over the agent’s life the utility-expansion path rotates in a counter-
clockwise fashion inducing substitution eﬀects. In terms of Figure 1, the agent retires at point
E1 where the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equal to w(R),
where R stands for this agent’s age at retirement. Using the dotted utility-expansion line
through point E1 we ﬁnd that the total eﬀect on consumption and leisure during working life
is given by the move from E0 to E1. The pure substitution eﬀect is given by the move from
E0 to E′, and the wealth eﬀect is the move from E′ to E1.
Armed with this graphical apparatus we can deduce the following analytical expressions.
Consumption of a newborn is given by:
C (v,v) =
εC (ρ + µ)
εC + (1 − εC)
 
1 − e−(ρ+µ)R(v)  · LI (v,v), (14)
where R(v) is the retirement age chosen by an agent born at time v, and LI (v,v) is lifetime
6During the working period, the budget line is given by:
X (v,τ) = w(τ)[1 − L(v,τ)] + C (v,τ),
where X (v,τ) is full consumption. The line BE0 is obtained by subsituting X (v,v).
8income of the agent:
LI (v,v) = w(v) ·
1 − e−(r−ˆ γ+θµ)R(v)
r − ˆ γ + θµ
+ LT (v,v), (15)





Equation (14) shows that consumption of a newborn is proportional to lifetime income. The
marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime income is decreasing in the retirement age.
Equation (15) provides the deﬁnition of lifetime income. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
represents the present value of the time endowment during working life, using the growth-
corrected annuity rate of interest (r − ˆ γ + θµ) for discounting. The later one retires, the
higher is this term. The second term on the right-hand side of (15) is just the present value
of transfers, deﬁned in (16).
Point E1 in Figure 1 is attained at the point where consumption satisﬁes:












Equations (14) (with (15) substituted), and (18) represent a simultaneous system implicitly
determining C (v,v)/w(v) and R(v) as a function of the structural parameters (εC, ρ, µ, r,
and θ), the macroeconomic growth rate (ˆ γ), and relative lifetime transfers (LT (v,v)/w(v)).
We illustrate the optimal retirement choice in Figure 2. This ﬁgure is based on the
following parameter settings. The interest rate is set at six percent per annum (r = 0.06)
whilst the rate of time preference is three and a half percent (ρ = 0.035). These values imply
that in the presence of perfect annuities, individual consumption grows at 2.5 percent per
annum (see (12)). The instantaneous mortality rate is estimated with Dutch mortality data
for the cohort born in 1960 (see below for details). This yields a value of 1.26 percent per
annum (µ = 0.0126), implying an expected remaining lifetime of 79.4 years. We assume that
labour productivity growth equals one percent per annum (ˆ γ = 0.01), and set the utility
parameter for consumption at such a value that the optimal retirement age with perfect


























































Figure 2: Optimal retirement age
annuities is R∗ = 42 years. This yields a value of εC = 0.3152. Finally, we assume that
annuities are perfect, i.e. θ = 1 in Figure 2. This simpliﬁes matters somewhat because
LT (v,v) = 0 for this case.
In Figure 2, the Ψ(R) function plots the combinations between C (v,v)/w(v) and R(v)
implied by equations (14)-(15) (with LT (v,v) = 0 imposed). Despite the fact that the
marginal propensity to consume is a downward sloping function of the retirement age, lifetime
income is sharply increasing in the retirement age and Ψ(R) is upward sloping as a result.
The downward sloping Φ(R) function plots equation (18) and intersects Ψ(R) at point EPA
0 .
There is a unique optimal retirement age which, for the parameters used here, equals R∗ = 42.
Figure 2 also illustrates the partial equilibrium eﬀects of a change in the macroeconomic
growth rate, ˆ γ. Indeed, the thin dashed lines depict the Φ(R) and Ψ(R) functions for the
zero-growth case (ˆ γ = 0), for which the optimal retirement age is R∗ = 29.7 years. In
10terms of Figure 1, this is the case where the agent moves from E0 to A along the dashed
utility-expansion curve. With a ﬂat wage proﬁle, equilibrium consumption at birth (and at
all ages) and the retirement age are both lower than with an upward sloping wage proﬁle.
Finally, we note that an increase in lifetime transfers leads to an upward shift in Ψ(R), higher
consumption at birth and a lower retirement age. The transfers thus cause a negative wealth
eﬀect on the optimal retirement age.
With imperfect annuities (0 < θ < 1) we must confront the issue of redistribution of
excess proﬁts and recognize the fact that LT (v,v) will be positive in general. To keep things
as simple as possible, we assume that the lump-sum transfers are set according to:
Π(v,τ) = z · w(τ), (19)
where z is a positive indexing parameter, that is taken as given by individual agents but
determined endogenously in general equilibrium via the balanced budget requirement of the





r − ˆ γ + θµ
. (20)
We prove in Heijdra and Mierau (2009a, Appendix A) that z is constant along the balanced
growth path.7 Equations (14)-(15), (18), and (20) in combination imply that the retirement
age is independent of v, i.e. R(v) = R∗ for all v. We summarize this important result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider lump-sum redistribution of excess proﬁts of life-insurance compa-
nies, of the form Π(v,τ) = z · w(τ). In that case: (i) the retirement age is independent of
v, i.e. R(v) = R∗ for all v; (ii) the ratio between consumption at birth and the wage rate at
birth is independent of v, i.e. C (v,v)/w(v) = εC
1−εCe−(r−ˆ γ−ρ−(1−θ)µ)R∗
for all v.
2.2.2 Aggregate household behaviour
In this subsection we derive expressions for per-capita average consumption, saving, and
labour supply. Following Buiter (1988), we allow for constant population growth π and
7An alternative feasible redistribution scheme would set Π(v,τ) = z·w(v), implying that LT (v,v)/w(v) =
z/(r + θµ) along the balanced growth path. Interestingly, “actuarially fair” lump-sum redistribution, setting
transfers according to Π(v,τ) = µ(1 − θ)A(v,τ), is infeasible. Under such a scheme, LT (v,v) becomes
unbounded which is clearly infeasible.
11distinguish between the birth rate, β, and the mortality rate rate, µ, so that π ≡ β − µ. The




= βeβ(v−t), t ≥ v, (21)
where P (v,t) is the size of cohort v at time t and P (t) is the total population. Using (21),





where X (v,t) denotes the variable in question at the individual level, and x(t) is the per
capita average value of the same variable.
Oﬀ the steady-state growth path, exact analytical aggregation of the individual behav-
ioural decision rules is impossible. To see why this is the case, note, for example, that con-
sumption of workers features an age-dependent propensity to consume out of age-dependent
wealth making aggregation impossible. We therefore focus on steady-state relationships. We






C (v,t) = C (v,v)e[r−ρ−(1−θ)µ](t−v), (24)










ˆ γ + β + ρ + (1 − θ)µ − r
. (25)
It follows from (13) and (23)-(24) that labour supply of workers in period t (t − v ≤ R∗)
can be written as:
L(v,t) = 1 − e−[r−ˆ γ−ρ−(1−θ)µ](R∗+v−t). (26)












ˆ γ + β + ρ + (1 − θ)µ − r
≡ l, (27)
with 0 < l < 1. The term in square brackets on the right-hand of (27) provides the ﬁrst
mechanism by which l falls short of unity: agents retire and their unit time endowment is
12consumed in full in the form of leisure. The second composite term on the right-hand side
of (27) represents the second mechanism by which l falls short of unity: as workers age they
reduce their labour supply.
At the individual level, ﬁnancial assets are accumulated according to:
˙ A(v,t) = (r + θµ)A(v,t) + w(t)L(v,t) + zw(v) − C (v,t), (28)
where L(v,t) = 0 for retirees (for t − v > R∗). Per capita aggregate assets are deﬁned as
a(t) ≡
  t




p(v,t) ˙ A(v,t)dv − βa(t), (29)
where we have incorporated the fact that individual agents are born bare of ﬁnancial assets
(A(v,v) = 0) and that cohort shares evolve over time according to ˙ p(v,t) = −βp(v,t).
Substituting (28) into (29) and noting (27) we obtain:
˙ a(t) = (r + θµ − β)a(t) + w(t)l(t) + zw(t) − c(t). (30)
The balanced-budget requirement for the lump-sum redistribution scheme is given in per
capita terms by:
µ(1 − θ)a(t) = zw(t). (31)
Finally, by substituting (31) into (30) we obtain:
˙ a(t) = (r + µ − β)a(t) + w(t)l(t) − c(t). (32)
Like in the standard case with perfect annuities, the aggregate per capita annuity receipts,
θµa(t), do not feature directly in (32) because they constitute pure transfers from the dead
to the living. In each period, life insurance companies receive µa(t) from the estates of the
deceased and pay θµa(t) to their surviving customers. The resulting proﬁt, (1 − θ)µa(t),
is taxed away by the government and redistributed to the surviving agents. The transfers
debudget from the per capita average asset accumulation equation.
2.3 Balanced growth path
In the absence of government bonds, the capital market equilibrium condition is given by
A(t) = K (t). In per capita average terms we thus ﬁnd:
a(t) = k(t), (33)





εC (ρ + µ)
εC + (1 − εC)
 
1 − e−(ρ+µ)R∗  ·
1 − e−(r−ˆ γ+θµ)R∗
+ z





























= (1 − εK)Z0 (T1.5)
l ≡ 1 − e−βR∗
− βe−βR∗ e[ˆ γ+β+ρ+(1−θ)µ−r]R∗
− 1











Deﬁnitions: Endogenous are C(v,v)/w(v), R∗, z, ˆ γ, l, w(t)/k(t), and c(t)/k(t). Parameters: birth
rate β, mortality rate µ, population growth rate π ≡ β − µ, imperfection annuities θ, rate of time
preference ρ, capital coeﬃcient in the technology εK, consumption coeﬃcient in tastes εC, scale factor
in the technology Z0. The interest rate is r ≡ εKZ0 − δ, where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
14where k(t) ≡ K (t)/P (t) is the per capita stock of capital. From (5)-(6) we easily ﬁnd:
y (t) = Z0k(t), (34)
w(t)l(t) = (1 − εK)y (t), (35)
where y (t) ≡ Y (t)/P (t) is per capita output.
The macroeconomic growth model has been written in a compact format in Table 1.
Equation (T1.1) is obtained by substituting (15) and (20) into (14). Equation (T1.2) is the
same as (23). Equation (T1.3) is (31) with (33) substituted. Equation (T1.4) is obtained by
substituting (33) into (32). Equation (T1.5) is obtained by combining (34)-(35) and noting
(27). Equation (T1.6) is the same as (27). Finally, (T1.7) is the same as (25).
The model features a two-way interaction between the microeconomic decisions and the
macroeconomic outcomes. Equations (T1.1)-(T1.2) determine scaled newborn consumption,
C (v,v)/w(v), and the optimal retirement age, R∗, as a function of the key macroeconomic
variables. Equations (T1.3)-(T1.7) determine equilibrium transfers, z, the macroeconomic
growth rate, ˆ γ, the overall wage-capital ratio, w(t)/k(t), aggregate labour supply, l, and the
c(t)/w(t) ratio as a function of the optimal retirement age and scaled newborn consumption.
3 Retirement, growth and annuities
In this section we compute and visualize the comparative static general equilibrium eﬀects
for the core model of Table 1. To compute the initial general equilibrium we assume that
annuities are perfect (θ = 1) and use the coeﬃcient values mentioned above (in the paragraph
below equation (18)). We assume that rate of population growth is one percent per annum
(π = 0.01). Since π ≡ β−µ, this implies that, for the mortality rate that was postulated above,
the birth rate is β = 0.0226. The capital depreciation rate is ten percent per annum (δ = 0.10).
We use the eﬃciency parameter of capital as a calibration parameter and ﬁnd εK = 0.9241.8
It follows that the constant in the production function is equal to Z0 = (r + δ)/εK = 0.1731.
The initial steady-state growth path has the following features: C (v,v)/w(v) = 0.2451,
R∗ = 42, z = 0, ˆ γ = 0.01, l = 0.1802, c(t)/w(t) = 0.7286, and w(t)/k(t) = 0.0729. For
8This is, of course, an implausibly high value, signalling that it is hard to obtain a calibration for the core
model that yields plausible values for all parameters. Below we introduce some model extensions that allow
us to substantially improve the quality of the calibration in this respect.
15convenience these values are restated in the ﬁrst column in Table 2(a).
Figure 3 visualizes some of the key features of the calibration. Figure 3(a) depicts the
general equilibrium determination of the retirement age and the macroeconomic growth rate.
The curve labeled MIE represents the microeconomic equilibrium condition, i.e. it depicts
(ˆ γ,R∗) combinations for which (T1.1) and (T1.2) are equated (recall that z = 0 in the base
case, so the microeconomic equilibrium can be computed conditional on the macroeconomic
growth rate only). In Figure 3(a), the line labeled MAE depicts the macroeconomic equi-
librium conditions, i.e. it depicts (ˆ γ,R∗) combinations for which (T1.3)–(T1.7) are satisﬁed.
The equilibrium is at point E0, where MIE and MAE intersect.
Figure 3 also illustrates the steady-state age proﬁles for the key variables (solid lines).
Figure 3(b) shows that the logarithm of scaled consumption is linear is the agents age. Figure
3(c) shows that the agent gradually reduces the number of hours supplied to the labour
market, and retires permanently at age R∗ = 42. Finally, Figure 3(d) shows that the path of
ﬁnancial assets is monotonically increasing in age, and features a slight kink at the retirement
age.
Next we consider the equilibrium under imperfect annuities. Instead of setting θ = 1, we
simulate the model with a value of θ = 0.70 and keep all other parameters the same. The
new equilibrium values for the diﬀerent variables are reported in the second column in Table
2(a). Obviously, with imperfect annuities lump-sum transfers become positive. Interestingly,
agents reduce lifetime labour supply and retire about one and a half years earlier than under
perfect annuities.
The new growth rate is about three quarters of its value under perfect annuities. In
Figure 4 we visualize the general equilibrium eﬀects of θ on the retirement decision and
scaled consumption of a newborn. The solid lines depict the case with perfect annuities
(θ = 1). The equilibrium is at point EPA. The thick dashed lines illustrate the case with
imperfect annuities (θ = 0.70), taking into account the general equilibrium eﬀects on ˆ γ and z.
The equilibrium with imperfect annuities is at point EIA, which lies north-west of point EPA.
Agents retire earlier in life and consume more at birth. The thinly dashed line in Figure 4
depicts the Ψ(R)-line for imperfect annuities, but assuming that the transfers are zero. The
total eﬀect of the move from EPA to EIA can thus be decomposed into a part that is caused
by the eﬀect of the growth rate, and a part that is caused by lump-sum transfers.
16Table 2: Growth and retirement: quantitative eﬀects
(a) Core case (b) Productivity (c) Mortality (d) Combined




0.2451 0.2606 0.1966 0.2065 0.2395 0.2421 0.2061 0.2067 0.1947
S∗ (years) 0 0 2.06 2.52 0 0 2.06 2.10 1.61
R∗ (years) 42 40.49 42 41.31 42 42.72 42 42.15 39.68
z 0 0.0465 0 0.0343 0 0.0115 0 0.0092 0
ˆ γ (%) 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.91 0.61
l (or n) 0.1802 0.1616 0.1862 0.1695 0.2162 0.2103 0.2385 0.2324 0.2284
c(t)
w(t)
0.7286 0.6881 0.5846 0.5596 0.3702 0.3623 0.3187 0.3123 0.3233
w(t)
k(t)
0.0729 0.0813 0.1004 0.1103 0.2597 0.2669 0.4990 0.5120 0.5211
17(a) growth (ˆ γ) and retirement age (R∗) (b) scaled consumption newborns (C(u)/w(0))

















































(c) labour supply (L(u)) (d) scaled ﬁnancial assets (A(u)/w(0))





































Figure 3: General equilibrium in the core model
The new steady-state age proﬁles for the imperfect annuity case have been illustrated in
Figures 3(b)–(d) (see the dashed lines). The growth rate in individual consumption is reduced
somewhat because −(1 − θ)µ features in equation (12). Figure 3(c) shows that the agent
reduces labour supply at all age levels and thus retires earlier than under perfect annuities.
Finally, Figure 3(d) shows that the age proﬁle for scaled ﬁnancial assets continues to be
upward sloping, though it is lower than under perfect annuities.
































































Figure 4: Imperfect annuities and the retirement date
194 Extensions
In the previous section we used a calibrated version of the core model to show that an
imperfection in the annuity market leads to a reduction in both the optimal retirement age
and the macroeconomic growth rate. The core model, though useful for analytical purposes,
suﬀers from a number of empirical deﬁciencies. These are:
(ED1). The age proﬁle for consumption is monotonically increasing, whereas it is
hump-shaped in reality (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002, and Fern´ andez-Villaverde and
Krueger, 2007).
(ED2). The age proﬁle for labour supply is monotonically decreasing. In reality, labour
supply is constant and age-invariant for most of working life and tapers oﬀ rapidly near
the optimal retirement age (see, for example, McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) for the
United States).
(ED3). Labour productivity is age-independent, whereas in reality it appears to be
hump-shaped (cf. Hansen, 1993 and Rios-Rull, 1996).
(ED4). Under perfect annuities, the age proﬁle for ﬁnancial assets is monotonically
rising. In reality, ﬁnancial assets (a) display a hump-shaped proﬁle, and (b) remain
non-negative in old age (Huggett, 1996). Feature (a) can be mimicked by assuming
imperfect annuities, but in that case assets become negative for very old agents, thus
violating feature (b).
(ED5). To calibrate the model for a realistic retirement age and macroeconomic growth
rate, an implausibly high eﬃciency parameter for capital must be postulated.
In this section we consider two important model extensions, namely age-dependent labour
productivity and age-dependent mortality. In each case we study whether, and to what extent,
the model extension under consideration can solve the empirical deﬁciencies of the core model.
Both individual decisions and (simulated) general equilibrium eﬀects are studied.
4.1 Hump-shaped productivity
In this section we directly address empirical deﬁciency (ED3) and assume that labour pro-
ductivity of individuals is hump-shaped. An analytically useful age proﬁle for productivity
20involves exponential terms:
E (u) = α0e−β0u − α1e−β1u, (36)
where E (u) is labour productivity of a u-year old worker, and we assume that α0 > α1 > 0,
β1 > β0 > 0, and α1β1 > α0β0. We easily ﬁnd that:
E (0) = α0 − α1 > 0, lim
u→∞E (u) = 0, (37)




> 0 for 0 ≤ u < ¯ u
< 0 for u ≥ ¯ u
, (38)










Labour productivity is non-negative throughout life, starts out positive, is rising during the
ﬁrst life phase, and declines thereafter.
The production side of the model is aﬀected as follows. The total stock of eﬃciency units




P (v,t)E (t − v)L(v,t)dv, (40)
where L(v,t) stands for labour supply in raw hours, and P (v,t) is the size of cohort v at
time t. Replacing Li by Ni in equation (1), and redeﬁning κi ≡ Ki/Ni and κ ≡ K/N, we ﬁnd
that (5) and (7) are still satisﬁed but (6) must be changed to:
w(t)N (t) = (1 − εK)Y (t), (41)
where w(t) stands for the rental rate on eﬃciency units of labour. The wage faced at time t
by a worker born at time v is thus given by:
w(v,t) ≡ E (t − v)w(t). (42)
The household side of the model is aﬀected as follows. In the household budget identity
(9), w(τ) is replaced by w(v,τ). Along the balanced growth path, w(v,τ) can be written as:





21where we have used (36) and (42). The consumption Euler equation is still given by (12).
Interestingly, with a hump-shaped wage proﬁle, it may be optimal for the agent to delay
labour market entry somewhat. Indeed, we now have two relevant dates for the working
decision of an agent, namely the optimal entry date, S∗, and the optimal retirement date,
R∗.9 Obviously, we must have that R∗ > S∗ ≥ 0. During working life (S∗ ≤ τ − v ≤ R∗) the
condition (13) still holds but with w(v,τ) replacing w(τ).




εC (ρ + µ)
εC + (1 − εC)
 










E (s)e−(r−ˆ γ+θµ)sds +
z
r − ˆ γ + θµ
. (45)
















Equations (44) (with (45) substituted), (46), and (47) form a three-equation system with
three unknowns, viz. C (v,v)/w(v), S∗, and R∗ (see Table 3(a)). This system can be solved
conditional on the macroeconomic variables, ˆ γ and z.
Using cross-section eﬃciency data for male workers aged between 18 and 70 from Hansen
(1993, p. 74) we ﬁnd the solid pattern in Figure 5(a). We interpolate these data by ﬁtting
equation (36) using non-linear least squares. We ﬁnd the following estimates (t-statistics in
brackets): α0 = 4.494 (ﬁxed), ˆ α1 = 4.010 (71.04), ˆ β0 = 0.0231 (24.20), and ˆ β1 = 0.050
(17.81). The ﬁtted productivity proﬁle is illustrated with dashed lines in Figure 5(a).
9As was the case in the core model of the previous section, household preferences and the redistribution
scheme are such that S
∗ and R
∗ are generation independent, i.e. S
∗ (v) = S
∗ and R
∗ (v) = R
∗ for all v.
10It is not diﬃcult to show that an interior solution for S













E (0)[1 − L(v,v)].
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e−(ρ+µ)S∗ − e−(ρ+µ)R∗ 
·
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E (s)e−(r−ˆ γ+θµ)sds +
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e[ˆ γ+β+ρ+(1−θ)µ−r](R∗−S∗) − 1











Deﬁnitions: Endogenous are C(v,v)/w(v), S∗, R∗, z, ˆ γ, n, w(t)/k(t), and c(t)/w(t). Parameters:
birth rate β, mortality rate µ, population growth rate π ≡ β−µ, imperfection annuities θ, rate of time
preference ρ, capital coeﬃcient in the technology εK, consumption coeﬃcient in tastes εC, scale factor
in the technology Z0. The interest rate is r ≡ εKZ0 − δ, where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
23(a) eﬃciency proﬁle (E(u)) (b) labour supply (L(u))


































(c) scaled consumption newborns (C(u)/w(0)) (d) scaled ﬁnancial assets (A(u)/w(0))














































Figure 5: General equilibrium with age-dependent labour productivity
24We have collected the key equations of the macroeconomic growth model in Table 3.
Eﬀectively this table provides the hump-shaped productivity analogue to Table 1. Compared
to Table 1, the main changed are as follows. First, there is an additional equation governing
the entry decision of households. Second, total labour supply is measured in eﬃciency units
(i.e. n rather than l features in (T3.5)–(T3.7)). Third, the labour productivity age proﬁle
features prominently in (T3.2)–(T3.3) and (T3.7). The key features of the initial steady-state
growth path have been reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 2(b).
Figures 5(b)–(d) provide a visualization of the extended model. The key panel to consider
is 5(b), which shows that with a hump-shaped productivity proﬁle, the labour supply proﬁle
also features a hump-shaped pattern. This model extension thus somewhat alleviates empir-
ical deﬁciency (ED2) of the core model. That is, we now have a labour supply proﬁle that
increases rapidly in young age, brieﬂy touches a plateau and then drops to zero (i.e. retire-
ment) quickly. Interestingly, the remaining empirical deﬁciencies (ED1) and (ED4)–(ED5)
are not solved by the introduction of age dependent labour productivity. Consumption and
assets are not hump shaped, and the required capital eﬃciency parameter, though lower than
for the core model, is still too high (εK = 0.8954).
As before, the dashed lines in Figures 5(b)–(d) visualize the implications of an imperfect
annuity market (captured by θ = 0.7). The key features of the new steady-state growth path
have been reported in column 2 of Table 2(b). Just as in the core model, agents retire earlier
when annuity markets are imperfect. Furthermore, and in contrast to the core model, we
ﬁnd that agents also delay labour market entry by almost half a year. Hence, the composite
impact of an imperfect annuity market on individual decisions is that agents delay labour
market entry, work less during working life and retire early. In general equilibrium this leads
to a substantial reduction in economic growth. Interestingly, the eﬀect on economic growth
is very similar for the core model and the extended model.
4.2 Age-dependent mortality
In this section we assume E (u) = 1 for all u and instead augment the core model by as-
suming age-dependent mortality. For ease of exposition, we use a demographic process which
incorporates a ﬁnite maximum age; the BCL-model suggested by Boucekkine et al. (2002).
25In this model, the surviving fraction up to age u (from the perspective of birth) is given by:




with µ0 > 1 and µ1 > 0. For this demographic process, ¯ D = (1/µ1)lnµ0 is the maximum






µ0 − eµ1u. (49)
The mortality rate is increasing in age and becomes inﬁnite at u = ¯ D.
We use data from age 18 onward for the Dutch cohort that was born in 1960. Following
Heijdra and Romp (2008), we denote the actual surviving fraction up until model age ui by Si,
and estimate the parameters of the parametric distribution function by means of non-linear
least squares. The model to be estimated is thus:






ui ≤ ¯ D
 
= 1 for ui ≤ ¯ D, and d
 
ui ≤ ¯ D
 
= 0 for ui > ¯ D, and εi is the stochastic
error term. We ﬁnd the following estimates (with t-statistics in brackets): ˆ µ0 = 122.643
(11.14), ˆ µ1 = 0.0680 (48.51). The standard error of the regression is ˆ σ = 0.02241, and the
implied estimate for ¯ D is 70.75 model years (i.e., the maximum age in biological years is
88.75). Figure 6(a) depicts the actual and ﬁtted survival rates with, respectively, solid and
dashed lines. Up to age 69, the BCL model ﬁts the data rather well. For higher ages the ﬁt
deteriorates as the BCL model fails to capture the fact that some people are expected to live
to very ripe old ages in reality.
Using the same data, we also estimate the parameter of the Blanchard demography, by
running the following regression by means of non-linear least squares: Si = e−µui + εi. We
ﬁnd ˆ µ = 0.0126 (11.41), and ˆ σ = 0.2466. The dotted line in Figure 6a depicts the ﬁtted
11This result follows from the fact that 1−Φ
  ¯ D
 
= 0 iﬀ e
µ1 ¯ D = µ0. Note furthermore that (for 0 < u,s < ¯ D),
the cumulative mortality rate is:
M (u) ≡ −ln[1 − Φ(u)],










26(a) mortality process (1 − Φ(u)) (b) labour supply (L(u))



































































(c) scaled consumption newborns (C(u)/w(0)) (d) scaled ﬁnancial assets (A(u)/w(0))

















































Figure 6: General equilibrium with age-dependent mortality
27survival rates implied by the Blanchard demography. The ﬁt is much worse than that of the
BCL model. Relative to the data, the Blanchard model “kills oﬀ” the young too quickly and
the old too slowly.
In the presence of age-dependent mortality, the core model is changed as follows. First,
as is explained in Heijdra and Romp (2008, p. 92), the lifetime utility function (8) is now
given by:
EΛ(v,t) ≡ eM(t−v).








where (a) the maximum possible age is incorporated in the upper limit of the integral, and
(b) the discounting factor due to lifetime uncertainty, e−M(τ−v) =
 
µ0 − eµ1(τ−v) 
/(µ0 − 1),
depends on the agent’s age at some future time τ.
Second, the annuity rate given in (10) above is modiﬁed to reﬂect the fact that the
mortality rate depends on age:
rA (τ − v) ≡ r + θµ(τ − v), (for 0 ≤ τ − v < ¯ D). (52)
Older agents attract a higher annuity rate than younger agents do because they feature a
higher mortality rate (note that at age τ − v = ¯ D no life insurance is available). Utility




= r − ρ − (1 − θ)µ(τ − v). (53)
Provided annuities are imperfect (θ < 1), optimal consumption growth is age dependent.
The key expressions characterizing individual behaviour are given in equations (T4.1)–
(T4.3) in Table 4. Equation (T4.1) gives the expression for scaled consumption at birth.













with 0 ≤ u0 < u1 ≤ ¯ D and λ2 ≥ 0. Provided λ1 is ﬁnite, the integral exists and is strictly pos-
itive. It follows that Ξ(r − ˆ γ,θ)
R∗
S∗ > 0, Ξ(r − ˆ γ,θ)
¯ D
0 > 0, Ξ(ρ,1)
R∗
S∗ > 0, and Ξ(ρ,1)
¯ D
0 > 0,
so scaled newborn consumption is positive and depends positively on the amount of transfers.
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= (1 − εK)Z0 (T4.6)



















· βΞ(π + ρ + ˆ γ − r,2 − θ)
¯ D
0 (T4.8)
Deﬁnitions: Endogenous are C(v,v)/w(v), S∗, R∗, z, ˆ γ, l, w(t)/k(t), and c(t)/w(t). Parameters:
birth rate β, aggregate mortality rate ¯ µ, population growth rate π ≡ β − ¯ µ, imperfection annuities
θ, rate of time preference ρ, capital coeﬃcient in the technology εK, consumption coeﬃcient in tastes
εC, scale factor in the technology Z0. The interest rate is r ≡ εKZ0 − δ, where δ is the depreciation
rate of capital.
29Interestingly, despite the fact that productivity is age-independent, equation (T4.2) show
that with imperfect annuities it is in principle possible for the individual agent to postpone
labour market entry somewhat, i.e. to choose S∗ > 0. With a realistic demography, however,
this scenario does not materialize, i.e. in practice labour market entry is immediate and
S∗ = 0. Intuitively, this results from the fact that the mortality process only cuts in toward
the end of the agent’s life.
The third aspect for which the core model is modiﬁed as a result of age-dependent mortal-
ity concerns the demographic system. As is shown in Heijdra and Romp (2008, p. 94), with










where β is the crude birth rate (as before), π is the growth rate of the population, and p(v,t)
is the relative size of cohort v at time t ≥ v. For a given birth rate, equation (55) determines
the unique population growth rate consistent with the demographic steady state. The average
population-wide mortality rate, ¯ µ, follows residually from the fact that π ≡ β−¯ µ.12 Equation
(55) simply generalizes (21) to the case with age-dependent mortality.
The macroeconomic part of the model is given by equations (T4.4)–(T4.8) in Table 4.
Compared to the core model, the main changes are found in (T4.4) and (T4.7)–(T4.8). In
(T4.4), transfers can no longer be related to a single aggregate variable but must be computed
(numerically) by using the scaled wealth paths of existing cohorts. Expressions (T4.7)–(T4.8)
generalize (T1.6)–(T1.7), making use of the Ξ(λ1,λ2)
u1
u0 function deﬁned in (54) above.
Just as for the previous two models, we calibrate the model for an initial steady state with
perfect annuities (θ = 1), a growth rate of one percent (ˆ γ = 0.01), and an optimal retirement
age of 42 years (R∗ = 42). The key features of the initial steady-state growth path have been












For the BCL demography we ﬁnd:
¯ µ = β ·















−π ¯ D − 1
µ1 − π
.
See Heijdra and Mierau (2009a) for further details.
30reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 2(c). As was mentioned above, labour market entry is
immediate for the cases considered in Table 2(c).
Figures 6(b)–(d) provide a visualization of the extended model. The key panels to consider
are 6(c) and 6(d). With imperfect annuities, consumption features a hump-shaped pattern
thus addressing empirical deﬁciency (ED1)–see the dashed lines in Figure 6(c). This ﬁnding
is in line with Yaari (1965), Abel (1985), B¨ utler (2001), and Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008):
with imperfect annuities the mortality rate features in the Euler equation. Hence, if the
mortality rate is age-dependent, agents will discount consumption later on in life more heavily,
thus creating a hump-shaped proﬁle. From an empirical point of view it should be noted that
we–like B¨ utler (2001) and Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008)–also ﬁnd that the hump occurs too
late in life. Also, as is illustrated in Figure 6(d), ﬁnancial assets feature a hump-shaped pattern
both with perfect and with imperfect annuities. The model extension thus ﬁxes empirical
deﬁciency (ED4) to a large extent. Finally, empirical deﬁciency (ED5) is reduced somewhat
in this extension as the required eﬃciency parameter for capital is equal to εK = 0.74 (rather
than 0.92 in the core model).
As before, the dashed lines in Figures 6(b)–(d) visualize the implications of an imperfect
annuity market (captured by θ = 0.7). The key features of the new steady-state growth
path have been reported in column 2 of Table 2(c). Just as in the core model, individual and
aggregate saving and thus the macroeconomic growth rate are all lower when annuity markets
are imperfect rather than perfect.13 Furthermore, and in contrast to both the core model and
the model with age-dependent productivity, we now ﬁnd that agents also delay labour market
exit by almost three-quarters of year. Hence, the composite impact of an imperfect annuity
market on individual decisions is that agents work slightly fewer hours during most of their
working life, but retire somewhat later thus limiting the fall in the aggregate supply of labour.
In general equilibrium this retirement eﬀect explains why the reduction in economic growth
is much smaller than for the previous two models.
In contrast to the core model, the calibration results of the model with a realistic de-
mographic structure suggest a less pronounced eﬀect of the annuity market imperfection;
compare panels (a) and (c) in Table 2. Instead of experiencing a reduction in the economic
13This ﬁnding regarding growth has previously been highlighted by Abel (1985) and Fuster (1999) who
suggest that capital accumulation decreases with imperfect annuities provided (i) the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is no less than unity and (ii) there is steady-state growth.
31(a) imperfection ((1 − θ)µ(u)) (b) cohort size (p(u))








































Figure 7: The annuity market imperfection
growth rate of 28 basis points, in the extended model we see a rather small reduction of only
6 basis points. Furthermore, instead of retiring 18 months early, agents now delay retirement
by almost 8 months. To appreciate the origin of these eﬀects, note Figures 7(a)-(b). Figure
7(a) visualizes the annuity market imperfection faced by the agent over the life-cycle. The
dashed line shows the imperfection for the Blanchard mortality process whilst the solid line
depicts the imperfection for the realistic case. From here it is immediately clear that the
Blanchard mortality process overstates the magnitude of the annuity market imperfection for
a substantial part of the life-cycle. In contrast, for a realistic demography the annuity market
imperfection only becomes an issue later on in life. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure
7(b), the relative size of cohorts that are actually aﬀected is quite small. Thus, both the
individual and the aggregate eﬀect of annuity market imperfections is much less pronounced
with a realistic demography.
4.3 Full model
In this section we visualize the full model, simultaneously incorporating age-dependent labour
productivity and mortality. The key equations for the full model have been collected in Table
5, whilst Figure 8 visualizes some of its salient life-cycle features. Finally, the quantitative
eﬀect of imperfect annuities are reported in Table 2(d).
Figure 8(a) plots the right-hand sides of (T5.2) and (T5.3) as a function of age. For θ = 1,
32there is a unique entry age (S∗ = 2.06, at point A) and a unique retirement age (R∗ = 42,
at point B). In contrast, for θ = 0.7, there appears to be a second labour market entry point
located to the right of point B. This point is not feasible, however, because we assume that
labour market exit is an absorbing state. Hence, also for θ = 0.7, there are unique entry and
exit ages, i.e. S∗ = 2.09 and R∗ = 42.15–see Table 2(d).
Figure 8(b) shows the age proﬁle for labour supply. It is hump-shaped because labour
productivity is, i.e. Figure 8(b) looks very much like Figure 5(b) above.
Figure 8(d) shows the age proﬁle for ﬁnancial assets. This ﬁgures captures the main
features of Figure 6(d), but adds a borrowing period at the start of life. Agents delay labour
market entry and–upon entry–face rather low wages and supply few hours early on in life.
They ﬁnance their rising consumption proﬁle by borrowing during that ﬁrst life phase.
Interestingly, the quantitative eﬀects of θ are rather small, as is revealed in Table 2(d),
column (i). First, the eﬀect on the retirement age is very small because the age-eﬀects in
productivity and mortality oﬀset each other. Second, the mortality eﬀect virtually eliminates
the positive eﬀect on the labour market entry age. Third, as the comparison between panels
(b) to (d) in Table 2 reveals, the mortality eﬀect constitutes the dominant mechanism by
which economic growth is reduced in the full model. Growth only falls by 9 basis points
(rather than 28 basis points for the core model). Finally, we note that empirical deﬁciency
(ED5) is reduced by quite a bit in the full model as the required eﬃciency parameter for
capital is equal to εK = 0.57 (rather than 0.92 in the core model).
4.4 The role of transfers in the full model
Up until now we have focused on the situation where the proﬁts made by the annuity ﬁrms
are redistributed toward the agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer. These transfers
have allowed us to focus solely on the substitution eﬀect of the annuity market imperfection.
However, in order to study the full (i.e. income and substitution) eﬀect of the imperfection
we need to consider an alternative general equilibrium mechanism by which the proﬁts of the
annuity ﬁrms are spent. In this subsection we assume that the government uses the funds
for non-productive spending. We refer the reader to Heijdra and Mierau (2009a) for detailed
derivations of the new equilibrium.
Compared to Table 5, there are two major changes. First, transfers are zero both with
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E (R∗)e−(r−ˆ γ−ρ)R∗+(1−θ)M(R∗) (T5.3)
(b) Macroeconomic relationships:
z = (1 − θ) ·





















= (1 − εK)Z0 (T5.6)






















· βΞ(π + ρ + ˆ γ − r,2 − θ)
¯ D
0 (T5.8)
Deﬁnitions: Endogenous are C(v,v)/w(v), S∗, R∗, z, ˆ γ, l, w(t)/k(t), and c(t)/w(t). Parameters:
birth rate β, aggregate mortality rate ¯ µ, population growth rate π ≡ β − ¯ µ, imperfection annuities
θ, rate of time preference ρ, capital coeﬃcient in the technology εK, consumption coeﬃcient in tastes
εC, scale factor in the technology Z0. The interest rate is r ≡ εKZ0 − δ, where δ is the depreciation
rate of capital.
34(a) entry/exit condition (b) labour supply (L(u))



















































(c) scaled consumption newborns (C(u)/w(0)) (d) scaled ﬁnancial assets (A(u)/w(0))
















































Figure 8: General equilibrium with age-dependent productivity and mortality
35(a) labour supply (L(u)) (b) scaled ﬁnancial assets (A(u)/w(0))





































Figure 9: Full model with useless government spending
perfect and imperfect annuities. Second, the imperfection surfaces directly in the relationship





















Figure 9 visualizes the impact of the annuity market imperfection on labour supply and
ﬁnancial assets (As in the full model with transfers, consumption is hump shaped.). Figure
9(b) shows that assets accumulation is increased slightly for younger agents and reduced
substantially for older agents. Furthermore, as in the core model and the ﬁrst extension we
ﬁnd that agents retire early. Although similar to the calibration results in the other models,
we ﬁnd that draining the proﬁts from the system leads to more pronounced results. That
is, the income eﬀect arising from the annuity market imperfection is substantial. This is
especially visible when considering the growth rate, which drops by 39 basis points–see Table
2(d), column (ii).
5 Conclusions
Although prominently present in economic theory, annuity markets are notoriously imperfect
in real life. In this paper we study the implications of an imperfect annuity market on, espe-
36cially, labour market decisions of individual agents and the general equilibrium repercussions
on, and of, economic growth. In contrast to Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa et al.
(2009) we focus on an imperfect but not absent annuity market. This novel feature allows
us to consider the impact of diﬀerent degrees of imperfection. Furthermore, in contrast to
Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), we explicitly focus on the labour market consequences of im-
perfect annuities. By studying endogenous intensive and extensive labour market decisions
we can focus on the key channels by which imperfect annuities aﬀect individual and aggregate
outcomes.
We model an imperfect annuity market by setting the interest rate on life-insured loans
and deposits below the actuarially fair rate. This assures that life-insurance ﬁrms make excess
proﬁts which have to be redistributed somehow. We then embed the imperfect annuity in
a core model featuring overlapping generations and endogenous growth. The core model
features age-independent wages and a constant mortality rate. Furthermore, we consider the
implications of a realistic individual productivity proﬁle and of a realistic mortality proﬁle.
We show that both extensions are needed to obtain a realistic calibration of the model.
The main ﬁndings emerging from our quantitative analysis are as follows. First, the way in
which excess proﬁts (arising from overpriced annuities) are redistributed has a large eﬀect on
the quantitative results. If these proﬁts are handed back to the agents in a lump-sum fashion,
then the annuity market imperfection only has rather modest eﬀects on labour market entry,
retirement, and macroeconomic growth. In contrast, if these proﬁts are consumed by the
government on useless activities, then the eﬀects are much larger. Labour market entry and
retirement both occur earlier in life, and the aggregate growth rate is reduced substantially
as a result of the annuity imperfection.
Second, the core model substantially overstates the retirement and growth eﬀects of the
annuity imperfection. This is because its assumed demographic process “kills oﬀ” the young
agents too quickly and the older agents not quickly enough. Optimizing macroeconomic
models must include a realistic demographic process for these models to be of any quantitative
use.
A rather robust ﬁnding from all model variants considered is that economic growth is
lower under imperfect annuities than with perfect annuities. This ﬁndings begs the question
whether there is role for a policy maker to mitigate the negative consequences of an imperfect
37annuity market. A natural candidate for such a policy is a public pension system. We aim
to study this and other issues in future work.
38References
Abel, A. B. (1985). Precautionary saving and accidental bequests. American Economic
Review, 75:777–791.
Blanchard, O.-J. (1985). Debts, deﬁcits, and ﬁnite horizons. Journal of Political Economy,
93:223–247.
Boucekkine, R., de la Croix, D., and Licandro, O. (2002). Vintage human capital, demographic
trends, and endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Theory, 104:340–375.
Buiter, W. H. (1988). Death, birth, productivity growth and debt neutrality. Economic
Journal, 98:279–293.
B¨ utler, M. (2001). Neoclassical life-cycle consumption: A textbook example. Economic
Theory, 17:209–221.
Cannon, E. and Tonks, I. (2008). Annuity Markets. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Conesa, J. C., Kitao, S., and Krueger, D. (2009). Taxing capital? Not a bad idea after all!
American Economic Review, 99:25–48.
Conesa, J. C. and Krueger, D. (2006). On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53:1425–1450.
d’Albis, H. (2007). Demographic structure and capital accumulation. Journal of Economic
Theory, 132:411–434.
Eckstein, Z., Eichenbaum, M., and Peled, D. (1985). Uncertain lifetimes and the welfare
enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security. Journal of Public Economics,
26(3):303–326.
Eichenbaum, M. S. and Peled, D. (1987). Capital accumulation and annuities in an adverse
selection economy. Journal of Political Economy, 95(2):334–54.
Fernandez-Villaverde, J. and Krueger, D. (2007). Consumption over the life cycle: Facts from
consumer expenditure survey data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89:552–565.
39Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J. (2002). Selection eﬀects in the United Kingdom individual
annuities market. Economic Journal, 112(476):28–50.
Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J. (2004). Adverse selection in insurance markets: Policyholder
evidence from the U.K. annuity market. Journal of Political Economy, 112(1):183–208.
Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J. (2006). Testing for adverse selection with “unused observ-
ables”. Working Paper 12112, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Fuster, L. (1999). Eﬀects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation
and growth. Economic Theory, 13:429–445.
Gourinchas, P.-O. and Parker, J. A. (2002). Consumption over the life cycle. Econometrica,
70:47–89.
Hansen, G. D. (1993). The cyclical and secular behaviour of the labour input: Comparing
eﬃciency units and hours worked. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:71–80.
Hansen, G. D. and ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu, S. (2008). Consumption over the life cycle: The role of
annuities. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11:566–583.
Heijdra, B. J. and Mierau, J. O. (2009a). Annuity market imperfection, retirement and
economic growth: Mathematical appendix. University of Groningen, May.
Heijdra, B. J. and Mierau, J. O. (2009b). Retirement and economic growth with uninsurable
mortality risk. University of Groningen, July.
Heijdra, B. J. and Romp, W. E. (2008). A life-cycle overlapping-generations model of the
small open economy. Oxford Economic Papers, 60:89–122.
Heijdra, B. J. and Romp, W. E. (2009a). Human capital formation and macroeconomic
performance in an ageing small open economy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 33:725–744.
Heijdra, B. J. and Romp, W. E. (2009b). Retirement, pensions, and ageing. Journal of Public
Economics, 93:586–604.
Huggett, M. (1996). Wealth distribution in life-cycle economies. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 38:469–494.
40Hurd, M. D. (1989). Mortality risk and bequests. Econometrica, 57:779–813.
Leung, S. F. (1994). Uncertain lifetime, the theory of the consumer, and the life cycle hy-
pothesis. Econometrica, 62:1233–1239.
Leung, S. F. (2007). The existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth deple-
tion time in life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint.
Journal of Economic Theory, 134:470–493.
McGrattan, E. R. and Rogerson, R. (2004). Changes in hours worked, 1950-2000. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 28:14–33.
Pecchenino, R. A. and Pollard, P. S. (1997). The eﬀects of annuities, bequests, and aging in an
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth. Economic Journal, 107:26–46.
R´ ıos-Rull, J. V. (1996). Life-cycle economies and aggregate ﬂuctuations. Review of Economic
Studies, 63:465–489.
Romer, P. M. (1989). Capital accumulation in the theory of long-run growth. In Barro, R. J.,
editor, Modern Business Cycle Theory, pages 51–127. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Saint-Paul, G. (1992). Fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107:1243–1259.
Yaari, M. E. (1965). Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the consumer. Review
of Economic Studies, 32:137–150.
41CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2653 Assaf Razin and Edith Sand, Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: 
Political-Economy Effect, May 2009 
 
2654 Yin-Wong Cheung and Hiro Ito, A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis of International 
Reserves, May 2009 
 
2655 Bart Cockx and Bruno Van der Linden, Flexicurity in Belgium. A Proposal Based on 
Economic Principles, May 2009 
 
2656 Michael Melvin, Lukas Menkhoff and Maik Schmeling, Exchange Rate Management in 
Emerging Markets: Intervention via an Electronic Limit Order Book, May 2009 
 
2657 Susanne Neckermann, Reto Cueni and Bruno S. Frey, What is an Award Worth? An 
Econometric Assessment of the Impact of Awards on Employee Performance, May 
2009 
 
2658 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Economic Geography 
within and between European Nations: The Role of Market Potential and Density across 
Space and Time, May 2009 
 
2659 Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa, Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than 
two?, May 2009 
 
2660 Carsten Kowalczyk and Raymond Riezman, Trade Agreements, May 2009 
 
2661 Oliver Falck, Stephan Heblich and Elke Luedemann, Identity and Entrepreneurship, 
May 2009 
 
2662 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, One Size Fits All? Decentralization, 
Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats, May 2009 
 
2663 Felix Bierbrauer, On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods, 
May 2009 
 
2664 Alessandro Cigno, Agency in Family Policy: A Survey, May 2009 
 
2665 Claudia M. Buch and Christian Pierdzioch, Low Skill but High Volatility?, May 2009 
 
2666 Hendrik Jürges, Kerstin Schneider, Martin Senkbeil and Claus H. Carstensen, 
Assessment Drives Learning: The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular 
Knowledge and Mathematical Literacy, June 2009 
 
2667 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, Schooling, Cognitive Skills, and the Latin 
American Growth Puzzle, June 2009 
  
2668 Ourania Karakosta, Christos Kotsogiannis and Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, Does 
Indirect Tax Harmonization Deliver Pareto Improvements in the Presence of Global 
Public Goods?, June 2009 
 
2669 Aleksandra Riedl and Silvia Rocha-Akis, Testing the Tax Competition Theory: How 
Elastic are National Tax Bases in OECD Countries?, June 2009 
 
2670 Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm, Incentive Contracts and Efficient 
Unemployment Benefits, June 2009 
 
2671 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Long Memory in US Real Output 
per Capita, June 2009 
 
2672 Jim Malley and Ulrich Woitek, Productivity Shocks and Aggregate Cycles in an 
Estimated Endogenous Growth Model, June 2009 
 
2673 Vivek Ghosal, Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization under Changing Market 
Conditions, June 2009 
 
2674 Francesco Menoncin and Paolo M. Panteghini, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation in 
the Real World, June 2009 
 
2675 Thomas Hemmelgarn and Gaёtan Nicodème, Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing 
the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive, June 2009 
 
2676 Oliver Himmler, The Effects of School Competition on Academic Achievement and 
Grading Standards, June 2009 
 
2677 Rolf Golombek and Michael Hoel, International Cooperation on Climate-Friendly 
Technologies, June 2009 
 
2678 Martin Cave and Matthew Corkery, Regulation and Barriers to Trade in 
Telecommunications Services in the European Union, June 2009 
 
2679 Costas Arkolakis, A Unified Theory of Firm Selection and Growth, June 2009 
 
2680 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, International 
Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly 
Determined, June 2009 
 
2681 Marcelo Resende, Capital Structure and Regulation in U.S. Local Telephony: An 
Exploratory Econometric Study; June 2009 
 
2682 Marc Gronwald and Janina Ketterer, Evaluating Emission Trading as a Policy Tool – 
Evidence from Conditional Jump Models, June 2009 
 
2683 Stephan O. Hornig, Horst Rottmann and Rüdiger Wapler, Information Asymmetry, 
Education Signals and the Case of Ethnic and Native Germans, June 2009 
 
  
2684 Benoit Dostie and Rajshri Jayaraman, The Effect of Adversity on Process Innovations 
and Managerial Incentives, June 2009 
 
2685 Peter Egger, Christian Keuschnigg and Hannes Winner, Incorporation and Taxation: 
Theory and Firm-level Evidence, June 2009 
 
2686 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis, Timing of Technology Adoption and 
Product Market Competition, June 2009 
 
2687 Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong and Jérémie Lefebvre, An Empirical Analysis of Legal 
Insider Trading in the Netherlands, June 2009 
 
2688 Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock and Roman M. Sheremeta, An Experimental 
Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, June 2009 
 
2689 Alexander Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran and Elisa Tosetti, Weak and Strong Cross 
Section Dependence and Estimation of Large Panels, June 2009 
 
2690 Mohamed El Hedi Arouri and Christophe Rault, On the Influence of Oil Prices on Stock 
Markets: Evidence from Panel Analysis in GCC Countries, June 2009 
 
2691 Lars P. Feld and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Political Stability and Fiscal Policy – Time 
Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849, June 2009 
 
2692 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual 
Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth, June 2009 
 
2693 Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann, Does Direct Democracy Reduce the Size of 
Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000, June 2009 
 
2694 Kirsten Wandschneider and Nikolaus Wolf, Shooting on a Moving Target: Explaining 
European Bank Rates during the Interwar Period, June 2009 
 
2695 J. Atsu Amegashie, Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s 
Dilemma, June 2009 
 
2696 Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, War and Relatedness, June 2009 
 
2697 Steven Brakman, Charles van Marrewijk and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Market 
Liberalization in the European Natural Gas Market – the Importance of Capacity 
Constraints and Efficiency Differences, July 2009 
 
2698 Huifang Tian, John Whalley and Yuezhou Cai, Trade Sanctions, Financial Transfers 
and BRIC’s Participation in Global Climate Change Negotiations, July 2009 
 
2699 Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer, Government Decentralization as a Disincentive 
for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis, July 2009 
 
2700 Balázs Égert, Tomasz Koźluk and Douglas Sutherland, Infrastructure and Growth: 
Empirical Evidence, July 2009  
2701 Felix Bierbrauer, Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large 
Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty, July 2009 
 
2702 Marc Gronwald, Investigating the U.S. Oil-Macroeconomy Nexus using Rolling 
Impulse Responses, July 2009 
 
2703 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Government Deficits in the European Union: An Analysis 
of Entry and Exit Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2704 Stergios Skaperdas, The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence, July 
2009 
 
2705 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation for 
the EU, July 2009 
 
2706 Bruno S. Frey, Punishment – and beyond, July 2009 
 
2707 Michael Melvin and Mark P. Taylor, The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market, July 
2009 
 
2708 Firouz Gahvari, Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-
advance Constraint, July 2009 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 